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FOURTH rROPOsiTION.-Kzowledge by the grantee or donee that

the grant or gift has been made is not necessary to its completeness
and irrevocability: (Jlavering v. Clavering (1704), supra, p. 7;
Sidmouth v. Sidniouth (1840), supra, p. 3.
Smith v. Lyne, 2 You. & Col. 345 (1843). Philip Lyne transferred to trustees a certain sum of 31. per cent. consols, and by an
indenture made between himself and the trustees, after reciting that
he was desirous of making provision for the plaintiff, a single woman
(who had cohabited with him, and by whom he had had two sons),
and for her infant children, and that he had that day transferred
the said sum into the names of said trustees, declared that the
trustees should stand possessed of the stock, upon trust, to pay the
dividend to himself for life, and after his decease, to the plaintiff,
&c. Philip Lyne did not communicate to the plaintiff the fact
of the settlement, but, after its execution, handed her a sealed
parcel with the endorsement that it was for her, and to be opened
after his death. She opened the parcel and found a copy of the
indenture, but, from fear of giving offence, made no mention to
the settlor of what she had done. For some time afterward,
Philip Lyne received the dividend by power of attorney, granted
to him by the trustees. Some years afterward he procured the
trustees to transfer the stock into his own sole name, and tore
off the seals from the indenture of settlement, which was found after
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his death among his papers. By his will, dated some five years
subsequently, he made certain provisions for the plaintiff.
For the executors it was argued that the plaintiff, after the date
of the execution of the indenture, had changed his intention, and
had therefore intended to substitute one provision for the other.
The Vice-Chancellor, Sir LANCELOT SHADWELL, said: "I am
unable to discover any serious question in this case: a trust is
created, a valid and binding trust, affecting a fund for which the
author of the trust afterwards becomes indebted to the cestui que
trust, or to the trustees, and through them to the cestui qUC trust.
* * * If the testator had meant the provision made for the plaintiff by the will to be in satisfaction of demands which she had
against him, he might have said so. * * * The plaintiff is entitled
to both provisions.'
Afiddleton v. Pollock, Ex parte Bliott, Law Rep. 2 Ch. Div.
104. JESSEL, M. R. (1-876). A solicitor to whom a sum of money
had been intrusted to invest, becoming insolvent (as to his knowledge
of which, however, therd was no proof), endorsed a bill of exchange
for that amount to his client, and executed a declaration of trust to
her, placing the bill of exchange and declaration of trust in an
envelope, endorsed with his client's name. The envelope was found
after his death, which occurred a short time thereafter, in a safe at
his office, where it had been placed by his confidential clerk. Held,
that the client was entitled to the declaration of trust and the
security, though she was not aware of their existence until they
-were discovered after the solicitor's death.
FIFTH PROPOSITION.-A complete conveyance or transfer of the
thing given has been made when the instrument of conveyance, ifa
deed, sets forth the fact of delivery, and the surrounding circumstances show that at the time of execution delivery was intended;
or where the propertygiven is personalty, and there is no instrument of conveyance, the thing given, though a chose in action, is
completely transferredwhere the legal title has actually vested in
the donee.
Lorimer v. Lorimer, 10 Yes. 367, n. (1.) 1822. Stock purchased
by a man in the name of himself and his wife, was, on his death,
held by the Vice-Chancellor to go to her as the survivor. MSS.
of Mr. Beams who was counsel against the wife: Sidmouth v. Sidmouth (1840), ante, p. 3.
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Xenos-v. Wickham et al., 14 C. B. N. S. (108 E. C. L. 435, 860)
(186:3-1867). The plaintiffs' insurance broker directed the defendants to insure a vessel belonging to the plaintiffs, for a certain period,
for 10001. The manner in which transactions of this kind were carried out was as follows: The broker sent the directions for the policy
upon a written slip, which was unstamped. The policy was then prepared ant stamped, and the amount of the premium, together with
the price of the stamp, debited to the broker in the defendant-s standing account with him. The policy was expressed to be sealed and
delivered in the presence of A. B., the defendant's secretary. The
policy was retained by the insurers until called for by the broker
or insured. The accounts of the insurer with the broker were settled nmonthly. At the expiration of a month from the insurance, the
insurer sent a debit note in the amount of the premium and the stamp
to the broker, when the broker disclaimed liability, stating that the
insurance had been made under a mistake, and requesting that the
policy should be cancelled. The policy was accordingly cancelled by
the insurers. The broker had no authority from the insured to rescind the contract, nor was the insured aware of the fact of the rescission until sometime afterwards, after the vessel had proved a loss.
The question was whether the insurers were liable, and this depended
upon the other questions, first, whether there had been a delivery
of the policy to bind the insurers ; second, whether the broker had
authority enough from the nature of his employment to rescind the
contract. The Common Pleas and the Exchequer Chamber decided
in favor of the defendants, 'MELLOR, J., and BLACKBURN, J., dissenting, but the decision of both courts was reversed by the House
of Lords (Lord CHELMSFORD and Lord CRANWORTI!), who held,
that there had been an actual delivery of the policy, and that after
its execution the insurers held it merely as bailees for the insured.
.owkces v. Pascoe, Law Rep. 10 Ch. Ap. 343 (1875). The testatrix purchased sums of btock several times in the names of herself and the son of her daught.er-in-law, and at the same time
slh- purchased stock in the names of herself and a companion.
By her will she gave the residue of her estate to her daughter-inlaw for life, and after her death to the son and daughter of her
daughter-in-law. The son of the daughter-in-law testified, that the
investment in the joint names had been intended as a gift to himself upon the death of the settler. Held, reversing JESSEL, M1.R.,
that though the testatrix had not placed herself in loco parentis
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to the son of her daughter-in-law, 16tthdevidence of a resulting
trust was rebutted, and the stock purlmzal in the joint names
-vent to the son of the daughtcr-in-lair upon W'tsettlor's death.
It will be observed that it w.1 ;mned in tho case, both in
the decision of the Master of the R61g, * i decided against the gift,
and in that of the Lords Justices,'-%%o reversed that decision, that
if the son of the daughter-in-law lht4 stood in'the place of a son
to the settlor, there would hav oA q,,i'.resulting trust at all.
SIXTH PROPOSITION.-A vuiWrw*-rbnveyance made with the
money of one in the name of anoqiefI,'jrfinarilyraises a presump-

tion of a resulting trust to the fonwr !,,ut the reverse is the case
where the person in whose name V,-e conveyance is taken or Purchase made is the wife or cWl- 4 the owner of the money. In
this ease the presumption arisl -.4 ,O
t it is a gift or advancement,
which may b5rebutted by contemporaneous (but not sbsequent)
evidence of a contrary intent.
In Story's Equity Jur., vol. 2, § 1202, after stating the general
rule, that where a man buys in the name of another, and Pays
the consideration-moniey, there is a resulting trust in favor of the
person purchasing, he adds: "But there are exceptions to the doctrine, as the resulting or implied trust is, in such a case, a mere
matter of presumption. It may be rebutted by circumstances established in evidence, and even by proofs which satisfactorily contradiet it. Thus, if a parent should purchase in the name of a son,
the purchase would be deemed primdfacie intended as an advance-

ment, so as to rebut the presumption of a resulting trust for the
parent," and see the cases cited in note 1 to that section. In tho
next section he says that the presumption in favor of the child ought
not to be frittered away by nice refinements. It was, perhaps,
rather to be lamented that it had been suffered to be broken in upon
by any sort of evidence of a merely circumstantial nature.
In Dyer v. Dyer, 2 Cox 92 (1788), HOTHAM, L. C. B., says it
has been determined in so many cases that the nominee being a
child, shall have such operation, as a circumstance of evidence,
that we should be disturbing landmarks, if we suffered either of
these propositions to be called in question, namely, that such circumstance should rebut the presumption of a resulting trust, and
that it should do so as a circumstance of evidence. I think it would
have been a more simple doctrine if the children had been consi-
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dered as purchasers for a valuable consideration. Natural love and
affection raised a use at common law; surely, then, it would rebut
a trust resulting to the father. See, also, Jeremy on Eq. Jur., b.
1, cl. 1, § 2, pp. 89 to 92. In § 1204, Story proceeds: The same
doctrine applies to the case of securities taken in the name of a
child. The presumption is that it is intended as an advancement,
unless the contrary is established in evidence. -Ebrandv. -Dancer,
2 Ch. Cas. 26; Lloyd v. Read, 1 P. Wins. 607; 2 Mladd. Ch. Pr.
101 ; 2 Fonbl. Eq., b. 2, ch. 5, § 2, noted.
Glaisterv.iewes,8Ves.195a,198(1802). SirWILLLX GRANT,
I. R. A purchase made in the name of a child of the purchaser is
primdfacie considered as an advancement intended for such child;
in order to repeal this presumption, evidence must be given of a
contrary intention contemporaneous with the purchase; an afterthought of that nature will have no effect: PrankerWav. Prankerd,
1 Sim. & Stu. 3; Finch v. .Fineh, 15 Yes. 50; -Dyerv.. Dyer, 2
Cox 94; s. c. 1 Watk. on Copyholds, 14th ed. 277, and 1 P. Wins.
112 n. The trust cannot arise from subsequent payments: Buck
v. Pike, 2 Fairf. 9; Steere v. Steere, 5 Johns. Ch. 1; Botsford v.
Burr, 2 Id. 409; Hoxie v. Carr,1 Sumner 188; Seward v. Jackso, 8 Cowen 406; 4 Kent. (5th ed.) 305-6.
The onus probandi does not rest with the child: 1?edington v.
.?edington, 3 Ridg. P. 0. 178 ; Finchv. Pinch, 15 Yes. 48. The
prior facts that the parent has taken possession of th6 purchased
estate and has taken the rents and profits, do not necessarily rebut
the presumption that the purchase was intended for an advancement:
Stilman v. Ashdown, 2 Atk. 480; Grey v. Grey, Rep. temp.
Finch 340; s. c. 2 Freem. 6, and 2 Swanst. 600; Taylor v. Taylor, 1 Atk. 368; Sidmouth v. Sidmouth, 2 Bear. 44T; Crabb v.
Crabb, 1 Mlylne & K. 511; .Kinim v. Kilpin, Id. 539.
In Rider v. Kidder, 10 Yes. 367 (1805), Lord ELDON, L. C.,
said "That though in general, where A. bought an annuity in B.'s
name, A. paying for it, and B. having no proof that it was meant
as provision for her, the court would raise a resulting trust, if there
was no relationship between the parties; yet there were exceptions
to that rule, fully discussed in a case of a copyhold estate in the west
of England, which was bought for successive lives. The habit was
to insert as feoffees the children of the purchaser. It was settled
in that case, that primd ffacie the relation would give the child an
interest, and perhaps that would prevail also in favor of a wife.
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But the case of a child was distinguished from that of a stranger, in
which there was not that natural affection that would beat down the
presumption arising from the advance of the money.
In a note to this case, it is said, "where, indeed, a conveyance
has been taken' in the name of a child of the purchaser, the ;rima
facie presumption is that the purchase has been made as an advance
for such a child."
MeIntire v. Hughes, 4 Bibb (Ky.) 186 (1815). Bill in equity
for specific performance. One Mintire had executed an obligation
under seal, to convey five hundred acres of land to his son, but
had died without completing the execution of the conveyance,
leaving a will by which the land was devised to two other sons.
BOYLE, C. J., said, that while it was true that a court of equity
would not enforce a specific execution of a contract merely voluntary, yet the obligation given by MlcIntire to his son was evidently
not of that description. -The relation between them of father and
son was not only alleged in the bill, but apparent upon the face of
the obligation, and that relation, though not valuable, was deemed
in law a good consideration. Under the Statute of Uses, the proximity of blood between the father and son was sufficient to support
a covenant by the former to stand seised to the use of the latter;
and if so, it must have been prior to the statute a sufficient consideration to have created the use, for the statute could only operate
to transfer the possession of the use where there was a use created.
Now, a use prior to the statute was similar to what was denominated
a trust since. It gave to the cestui que use no right to the thing,
but it gave him a right in equity to demand the thing. And prior
to the statute it was a common practice to resort to a court of chancery to enforce the execution of an use, as it still was to enforce the
execution of a trust. The inference was, therefore, clear, that proximity of blood had always been a sufficient consideration to warrant
the interposition of a court of equity, where there was no other circumstances in the case which forbade such interposition: Newland
on Contracts 69, 70.
Dennison v. Goehring, 7 Barr 175 (1847). In this case, land
purchased with the money of Dennison had been conveyed to
Sturgeon, who then conveyed it to Dennison, in trust, to apply
the rents to the education of Dennison's three children. Other
children having been afterwards born to Dennison, this action
of account render was brought by one of the cestuis que trust,
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Sturgeon's -wife, against Dennison, to enforce the trust. Ginsox, 0. J., held the trust executed, and that, therefore, though
voluntary, the plaintiffs, the cestuis que tru8t, were entitled to
its being carried out. The mere fact that the legal estate was
vested in the trustee, and the cestuis qua trust therefore required the
intervention of a court of equity to compel the execution of the
trust, did not disentitle them to relief. "It is an elementary principle, that a purchase by a father in the name of his child, is primd
facie an advancement, though the legal presumption that it is so
may be rebutted by circumstances."
The cases are analogous in which an uncle or grandfather, being
in loco parentis,and the father alive, the court has presumed against
double portions: Powys v. M11ansfield, 3 Myl. & Cr. 859 ; -Ex parte
P!e, 18 Ves. 140; Monea/ v. Lord Monek, 1 B. & B. 298; Trimme v. Baine, 7 Yes. 508; Booker v. Allen, 2 Russ. & Mly. 270.
The definition of one standing in loco parent/s is one "meaning
to put himself in loo parentis,in the situation of the person described
as the lawful father of the child." Lord ELDpN, -Ez Parte Pye,
supra. "A person assuming the parental character or discharging
parental duties." Sir WiLL Am GRANT, Wetherby v. Jixon, 19
Ves. 412. In Monck v. Lord Monek, supra, an uncle was held to
stand in loao parentisto his niece; in Trimmer v. Baine, sulra, a
father to his natural child (for legal purposes a stranger); in Booker
v. Allen, a descendant-of a great-uncle was held to stand in loco
filia.
To the foregoing cases may be added the following, which illustrate one or more of the above propositions :Bay v. Simmons, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 15 Am. Law
Reg. N. S. 701; and Mr. Dale's note.
The deceased in this case had deposited in a savings bank certain
money belonging to him in his own name, as trustee for his stepdaughter, the plaintiff. His bank deposit-book was headed, "Dr.,
Fall River Savings Bank, in account with Levi Bosworth, Trustee
for Marianna Ray, Proy. Cr." The account was credited with all
the accrued dividends upon the amount deposited, excepting one
which was paid to the depositor, who had, not withdrawn any part
of the money deposited by him. The decedent had no children,
and the plaintiff was treated by him as his own daughter. Decedent brought the bank book home and threw it into the plaintiff's
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lap. The plaintiff opened it, looked at it, and said she was much
obliged for the present. The bank book was then put by the decedent's wife in a box of her own, and remained there at the decedent's
death. The action was brought against the decedent's administrator.
Held, that the trust was completely executed, though voluntary:
Braybrooke v. The Boston Pive Cent Savings Bank, 104 Mass.
228; O/ark v. Clark, 108 Mass. 522, are distinguished.
In Hill v. Stevenson, 63 Mle. 364 (1873, APPLETON, C. J.), the
decedent had handed to her son-in-law her deposit book, containing
her account with the savings bank, in which a considerable sum was
standing to her credit, at the same time saying to him that she gave
the money in that bank on her book to her two daughters; that
she wished her son-in-law to take the book, and after her decease to
divide the money equally between them. This was a bill in equity
by the daughters against their mother's representative. Held, that
the delivery of the bankbook was a good gift of the deposits, when
made as here with the intent to give the donee the deposits represented by it.
Howardv. Windham County Savings Bank, 40 Verm. 597 (1868),
was assumpsit to recover money belonging to the plaintiff's intestate,
and deposited by her in the defendant bank, in the name of her
niece. At the time the deposit book was made, a deposit book was
taken by the decedent, in which the treasurer of the bank had made
the following entry: "1864, No. 530, Adeline F. Brown (the
niece) deposited $220." The deposit book was found among the
effects of the decedent after her death, and came into the plaintiff's
hands, as her administrator. There 'as no evidence that Adeline
F. Brown, the decedent's niece, had any knowledge of the deposit,
or that her husband had such knowledge, until after the decedent's
death. "The presumption," says the judge, "is that all this was
done by and under the direction of the donor, and intended by her
as evidence of a perfected gift. The bank, in virtue of the deposit,
had a right to regard Adeline F. Brown as a depositor, and legal
owner of the money. The transaction constituted an agreement
and legal privity between the bank and Adeline F. Brown, by force
of which the bank became accountable to her, and to no other person; she thereby became bound by the by-laws and regulations of
the corporation in respect to the deposit, after which the donor had
no power to recall the gift, and it is not claimed that she ever at-
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tempted to recall it. * * * It is true that the deposit book is evidence of the deposit, but it is no better evidence than the entry of
the deposit made in the treasurer's book, and retained by him.
Suppose the treasurer had neglected to make and deliver a duplicate
of the deposit, we think it would hardly be claimed that the rights
of the bank or the depositor would be affectedby such neglect. * * *
The possession of the book alone gave the intestate no power or
authority to control the deposit, or interfere with it."
In Minor v. 1?ogers, 4 Conn. 512 (1873), the decedent, a
widow, who possessed considerable property, and had no children, deposited $250 in a savings bank in her own name, as
trustee for a lad, the child of friends of hers, who was frequently
at her house, and in the habit of doing errands for her. She had
frequently made him presents in return. After making the deposit
the decedent told the boy's friends that she had deposited that
amount in the savings bank for their son, saying that he would need
it for his education. The decedent kept the bank book, and afterwards drew out the money and appropriated it to her own use. In
a will subsequently made no mention was made of the deposit or of
the donee. Held, a complete irrevocable gift at the time .of the
deposit. PARK, J., said: "If she had made the deposit in the
name of the plaintiff alone, or had made some other person than
herself trustee for the plaintiff, no question could have arisen regarding the completeness of the gift."
In Millspaugh v. Putnam, 16 Abbott's Practice -Reports 380,
money was deposited in a bank in the depositor's name, in trust for
a third party. Held, to raise a presumption of an intended gift by
the depositor to the eestui que trust.
In Camp's Appeal, 35 Conn. 88 (1869), t&'g&cedent handed
his bank book, containing an account of moneys deposited in the
decedent's own name, to his nephew, telling him that if he, the
depositor, never called for the deposit book, the latter should keep
it. Hfeld, an executed gift of the money deposited.
In Gardnerv. Merritt, 32 Md. 78 (1869), the decedent deposited
moneys at various times in a savings bank to the credit of her grandchildren, having caused accounts to be opened in the bank in the
name of each of them as a minor, subject in each case to the
depositor's order or that of her daughter.
VOL. XXVI.-11
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The depositor, about the time when she began making these
deposits, stated that she was going to put the money in bank for
the children. Held, that though the depositor retained control
of the deposits, the gift was executed, the control retained being fr
the benefit of the donors, to whom an executed gift had been made.
In Currant v. _ago, 1 Collyer 261, 266 (1844), the plaintiff
and her husband adopted as their child the plaintiff's nephew,
who was maintained and educated by them until he went to
sea. He died intestate during his minority. At various times
moneys belonging to the plaintiff's husband were invested by
him in the nephew's name.- These sums, with their accumulations,
were never disturbed excepting once, when the plaintiff.drew out
two pounds, being the amount of the accrued interest upon the
deposit for a certain period. The plaintiff's husband having died,
she brought this bill in equity'against the father of her deceased
nephew, who was his personal representative, and the trustees of the
bank, alleging that the investments were made with the sole view
of providing for her nephew in the event of his surviving both the
plaintiff and her husband, and asking for a declaration that the
sums deposited were held in trust by her as executrix of her husband. Held, by the Vice-Chancellor, that the gift was executed,
and that the presumption of a resulting trust was displaced by the
relations of the parties and the circumstances of the case; that the
exercise of dominion over the fund by the 'withdrawal of a portion
of it did not displace the donee's title. "I think it probable,"
said the Vice-Chancellor, "that if their attention had been called
to the subject the gift would have assumed that shape (i. e., a benefit
to the nephew, contingent upon the donors both dying in the infant's
lifetime), but the circumstances never so presented themselves to
the minds of the parties, and accordingly the matter was not so
arranged."
The latest case is Reed v. Roberts, 3 Weekly Notes of Cases
(Pa.) 453. There A., who had no descendants living, adopted B.,
the niece of his wife, when under fourteen years of age, and from
that time forward treated her as his own child. By his will, A.
provided for B. Shortly before his death, and subsequent to the
execution of the will, A. received in payment of a debt a large
number of shares of stock of a railroad corporation. The new certificates were by his order made out in the name of B., and the

